There are two ways to make money as an insurer. You can make it on the underwriting, by taking in more premium than you pay out in claims and costs. Or you can make it on the “float” (the premiums you get to hold and invest while you wait for the claims to arrive). Most insurers do a bit of both.

What’s less well known is that at Lloyd’s of London somebody other than the insurer is checking the first one. Lloyd’s isn’t an insurance company - it’s a market of separate underwriting businesses called syndicates - and Lloyd’s itself holds every one of them to an underwriting-profit standard.

Outside Lloyd’s (and that includes the other half of London’s own insurance market, known as the “company market”) it’s each insurer’s own call how much to lean on the float.

That difference matters most when the price of insurance risk is falling and underwriting margins are being compressed.

This issue looks at who the new money is, why it wants to be in insurance, and what Lloyd’s does about it that other insurance markets don’t.

What’s happening now.

Earlier this month Patrick Tiernan, CEO of Lloyd’s, told a London conference that for 330-odd years risk came to the market to find capital, and “now we are seeing capital come to the market to find risk.”¹

Insurance prices are falling - Lloyd’s own numbers show prices down 6.7% in the first half of this year, after a 3.5% fall in the first half of 2025.² So money is turning up just as the reward for taking insurance risk is declinging, which raises the obvious question: what is it here for?

Who’s turning up?

Regular readers won’t be surprised that some of it belongs to the alternative asset managers (see Issue 10).

Fitch, the rating agency, wrote last December: “Private credit is a key driver of recent Lloyd’s activity.”³ It pointed to three partnerships behind new syndicates - Blackstone with AIG, Blackstone with Fidelis and Oaktree with Allianz (names you’ll know better from private equity and credit than from insurance). The way Fitch tells it, the partnerships use the premiums flowing through those syndicates to fund higher-risk private credit, and pick up fees along the way.

It isn’t just Lloyd’s. AM Best, another rating agency, reported in September that private credit firms are among the investors in new casualty “sidecars” - vehicles that let outside investors take a share of an insurer’s book.⁴ (Casualty is liability insurance, where claims can take years to settle.) Its view was that the returns compare well with private credit.

Why would an asset manager want an insurer?

For the float. Higher interest rates mean it earns more, and for an asset manager it’s also more money to manage.

The knock-on is simple enough: the more you expect to make on the float, the less you need to make on the underwriting.

Issue 12 covered an extreme version of this. The hedge fund reinsurers of the 2010s set out to roughly break even on the underwriting and make their money on the investments - and Third Point Re went nine years without reporting an underwriting profit. (None of that is evidence that today’s entrants are doing the same, but you can see the incentive.)

Two kinds of capital.

My own view is that there are really two kinds of capital behind insurance risk:

  • Capital that depends on the underwriting. The float income is a bonus.

  • Capital that depends on the float. The underwriting income is a bonus.

The danger with the latter is that both sides can go wrong at once. AM Best made the point about casualty sidecars, where the float is often invested in credit: an inflation spike or a credit contraction “can hurt both sides of the vehicle at once.”⁴ In other words, claims go up at the same time as the assets meant to pay them go down.

London is two markets.

It’s easy to use “London” and “Lloyd’s” interchangeably, but they’re not the same thing.

Lloyd’s is a little over half of the London market, writing about £58bn of premium last year. Most of the rest is the “company market” - around 80 insurers, many of them branches of big international groups, writing about £49bn between them.⁵ Big risks usually get split between several insurers, and it’s common to find Lloyd’s syndicates and company-market insurers sharing the same one.

Both halves answer to the UK’s financial regulators. The difference is that Lloyd’s adds a layer of its own on top. In the company market, how much underwriting profit to insist on is a matter for each insurer’s board. At Lloyd’s it isn’t left to the individual insurance companies (known as “syndicates”) that operate in the market.

How does Lloyd’s do it?

The easiest way to think about Lloyd’s is as a franchise, with Lloyd’s as franchisor and the firms that run syndicates as franchisees.⁶

The logic is the same as for any franchise. Every syndicate trades on the same credit rating, and behind every policy sits a central fund that all the syndicates’ backers pay into⁷. Because one syndicate’s losses can end up being everyone’s problem, the franchisor sets the standards.

The yardstick is the combined ratio (claims and costs as a percentage of premium - anything under 100% is an underwriting profit). Lloyd’s target for the market as a whole is under 95% through the cycle, measured over ten years.⁸

Here’s how it works in practice:

  1. A syndicate can only write business under an annual plan that Lloyd’s has agreed.

  2. Lloyd’s assesses every syndicate against 13 principles - the first is underwriting profitability - and puts it in one of five categories, from Outperforming down to Unacceptable.

  3. The strongest are given room to grow; the weakest are made to fix what’s wrong.⁹

No other insurance market ‘performances manages’ in this way.

Does it work?

Not always. Lloyd’s has been approving syndicate plans since the early 2000s, and in 2017 it still paid out £114 in claims and costs for every £100 of premium. Its response was to make every syndicate fix or drop the worst tenth of its business (see Issue 11).

It isn’t free, either. Lloyd’s cut close to a fifth of its premium between 2018 and 2020,¹¹ and that business didn’t just disappear. “We are definitely seeing business from Lloyd’s coming through our door,” as one company-market insurer put it in 2019.¹²

Part of the appeal of a company-market platform is that a carrier can grow there without Lloyd’s oversight.¹³

What I take from this.

With any insurance investment it’s worth knowing which of the two ways it’s relying on to make money, and whether anyone other than the underwriter is holding it to its stated aims. Investing at Lloyd’s means you have a third-party motivated to protect underwriting margin.

Looking ahead.

Two things I’ll be looking out for.

  • The 1 January renewals (when a large share of the world’s reinsurance contracts renew), which will show how far prices have fallen.

  • Lloyd’s combined ratio for 2026, which it reports in March 2027.

The standing invitation holds. If you’ve been sitting on a question - about a product, a structure, an idea - send it over.

Until then.

Charlie Evans, CAIA
Chief Investment Officer, Zephyros Investments

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¹ Insurance Insider, “LMC postcard: Capital comes looking for risk”, 12 November 2026

² Lloyd’s, half-year results 2026, 3 September 2026

³ Fitch Ratings commentary, December 2025, as reported by Artemis, 30 December 2025

⁴ AM Best, as reported by Artemis, 15 September 2026

⁵ International Underwriting Association, London Company Market Statistics Report 2026; Lloyd’s full-year results 2025

⁶ HMRC, Lloyd’s Manual, “Market developments: 2002 onwards”

⁷ Lloyd’s, “Why is Lloyd’s rated as a market?”

⁸ Lloyd’s 2026 Strategy

⁹ Lloyd’s, Performance Management Supplemental Requirements and Guidance, and Lloyd’s Oversight Framework

¹⁰ Reinsurance News, “Lloyd’s issues framework for broker-originated reinsurance structures”, 19 October 2026

¹¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, April 2021

¹² Insurance Journal, 24 June 2019

¹³ Insurance Insider, “Analysis: The premium gap has narrowed between Lloyd’s and the London company market”